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Introduction
Within the field of complex networks [1], the investigation of
financial networks is currently one of the emerging avenues [2,3],
also in view of the on-going global financial crisis.
A major issue concerns the assessment of the systemic
importance of nodes, especially in the face of partial information
on the network of dependencies. While financial contagion on
networks [4–6] differs in some important respects from the
epidemics spreading [7,8], in both processes the topological
structure of the network plays a crucial role in the collective
dynamics and therefore in the emergence of systemic risk. A body
of work focuses on networks reconstructed from correlations
among equity prices or return time series [9–12]. For instance, the
analysis of the minimum spanning tree provides insights into the
classification of stocks and the level of correlation depending on
the market phase. Correlation analysis suffers, however, from
some important limitations, the main one being that zero
correlation between two series does not imply that they are
independent (only the inverse is true). To overcome these
limitations, here we utilise a method based on the detection of
joint e-drawup, which allows us to estimate the probability that two
series exhibit a co-movement. An e-drawup is essentially a
persistent upward movement in a time series until a peak has
been reached, after which the time series experiences a decline (or,
has a ‘‘correction’’) that exceeds the amplitude e (see Methods).
Moreover, in contrast to equities, CDS prices reflect the default
probability of the reference entity and thus the network
constructed from CDS prices are more relevant in studying the
propagation of default risk.
Our approach can be applied to construct networks of
dependencies in other financial markets. In general, it applies to
all domains of networks in which links are, for any reason,
unobservable but the dynamics of the nodes reflect the depen-
dency structure. To summarise, the contributions of the paper are
the following. First, we build on the e-drawdown method [13] to
estimate the probability of joint e-drawups, which are essentially a
particular type of co-movements across time series. Based on this,
we estimate the level of the so-called interdependence and trend
reinforcement [14,15], in the system across different phases of the
market (see Figure 1). This finding is of interest in light of previous
theoretical work on the emergence of systemic risk [16]. Second,
we construct a network of interdependencies among institutions
and we introduce two novel centrality measures that allow for the
identification of systemically important nodes in the network. Our
approach enables the disentanglement of a structure that is, only
apparently, very homogenous. It also allows us to track how the
role played by nodes in the network evolve in time.
Results
Interdependence and trend reinforcement
Whilst interdependence can be seen as a form of risk
diversification which decreases individual risk, previous work
[16] has demonstrated that high interdependence leads, instead, to
higher systemic risk when coupled to a so-called trend reinforce-
ment [14]. We thus proceed to investigating the presence of
interdependence and trend-reinforcement in the CDS markets. In
our context, trend reinforcement refers to the tendency of an e-
drawup to be followed by another e-drawup in the same time
series. Interdependence refers, in contrast, to the existence of co-
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movements between two different time series (i.e. an e-drawup
followed by another one in a different time series). Here, we take
the frequency of e-drawup’s in i as an estimate of the probability
Pi that security i has an e-drawup. Similarly, for the frequency of
joint e-drawup’s we estimate Pij , i.e. probability that j experiences
an e-drawup given that i experiences an e-drawup. The expected
probability of joint drawup’s in the case of two statistically
independent time series is Pij~PiPj . Therefore, we take as an
estimate of interdependence between two financial institutions, the
deviation from such a case, i.e. Wij~Pij{PiPj . Finally, in order
to account for finite size effects, we consider only those values of
Wij that cannot be rejected based on a permutation test and we
reset to zero all the other values. In such test, each Wij value is
retained only if it is found to have less than 5% chance to come
from a distribution obtained after permuting the position in time
of all the e-drawup’s. For more details, see Correction for
Randomness in Section Materials and Methods. In the following,
we refer to this procedure when we say that values are statistically
significant at a 95% confidence interval.
We also account for a time lag t~0,1,2,3 days between the
drawup’s and we take the average of Wij across t values.
Analogously, we take as an estimate of the trend reinforcement for
institution i the deviation: Wii~Pii{PiPi and we treat it as
above. Notice that, because of the time lag t, Wij is not a
symmetric matrix. Notice also that a positive value of Wij does not
imply a causality relation between the movements of i and j, but
measures the dependence of j due from i in terms of a conditional
probability.
The distribution of Wij ’s and Wii’s are shown in Figure 2 a, b.
The histograms count only the non-zero values of Wij ’s and Wii’s
(i.e., as explained above, only those that are found to be
statistically significant at a 95% confidence interval, according to
the permutation test. We find statistically significant levels of trend
reinforcement, in about 50%, 72% and 80% of the nodes
(respectively in period 1, 2 and 3). The range of values of Wii
across periods 1, 2, and 3 are: 0:32+0:28, 0:36+0:29, and
0:19+0:14 respectively. In Figure 2 b), the curve for period 2 and
3 is mostly above the one for period 1. This means that the
number of nodes with a significant level of trend reinforcement
increases when the market moves from the first phase to the
following two, more volatile, phases. We also find statistically
significant levels of interdependence in 54%, 78% and 77% of
pairs of nodes in period 1, 2, 3, respectively. The range of values of
Wij across periods 1, 2, and 3 are: 0:21+0:12, 0:23+0:14, and
0:24+0:18, respectively. The histograms of Wij (see Figure 2 a)
show that periods 2 and 3 are characterised by higher frequencies.
In fact, 20% of pairs in period 2 and 19% pairs of nodes in period
3 exhibit values of Wij greater than the mean plus one standard
deviation of period 1. Moreover, while in period 1, nearly all
values of Wij are smaller than 0.5, in period 2 and 3 there is a tail
extending up to 1.
These findings show that interdependence and trend reinforce-
ment are indeed present in an important market such as the one
for CDS’s. Moreover, trend reinforcement increases from period 1
to period 2, and even more so does interdependence.
Network analysis and centrality
There is a growing body of works looking at CDS markets, and
more in general at derivative markets, as networks in order to
investigate the systemic importance of market players [17]. In light
of the previous section, in our context The CDS market can be
naturally mapped into a directed and weighted network in which
nodes represent institutions and edges represent interdependencies
among institutions. More precisely, whenever Wijw0 (recall that
we have retained only the values that are statistically significant,
see Materials and Methods), we assign a weighted edge with value
Wij from institution i to j. Since Wij is the probability that
conditional to i experiencing a draw-up, j also experiences a draw-
up with a time lag 0ƒtƒ3, it follows that the stronger the edge,
the stronger the impact that i has on j. When looking at the
properties of connectedness of the network, we find a significant
number of disconnected nodes in all three periods (81, 39, 39,
respectively). Remarkably, the rest of the nodes form only one
strongly-connected component (LSCC, see Materials and Meth-
ods) encompassing, respectively, 95, 137, 137 nodes in period 1, 2
and 3. The density of links (i.e. the number of links over the
number of possible links) in the LSCC is high in all the three
periods: 0.98,0.97, 0.97. This is reflected also in the average out
degree in the LSCC’s across the three periods, which is 90+8,
129+11, and 123+19. Finally, the average path length within the
LSCC’s is 1.04, 1.05 and 1.2, meaning that almost all the nodes in
the LSCC are first neighbours to each other. In such a structure,
each node has a direct impact on all the other nodes, and each of
these has a further impact on all the others. Intuitively, this finding
suggests that the financial distress at one node in the SCC can
quickly propagate to all the other nodes in the LSCC and keeps
reverberating through the many connections.
Centrality measures are used in order to understand the
systemic impact of nodes in a financial network, e.g. DebtRank
[6]. Here we want to focus on both the impact that a node makes
on the others as well as on the impact that all the others make on
it. The out- and in-degree of a node are the simplest measures of
centrality that hold a valuable interpretation here: A high out-
degree represents the ability of a node to affect many neighbours
when it experiences a draw-up; a high in-degree corresponds to a
node being affected by many nodes. Since the network is almost a
complete graph, based on the out-degree, all nodes are equally
systemically important and equally affected by the others. As an
alternative approach, based on the notion of feedback centrality,
for each node i we introduce a novel measure, called impact
centrality and denoted as ci, see Eqn. 1. The measure takes into
account, in a recursive way, the fact that a node is more
systemically important if it impacts many systemically important
Figure 1. Time series of credit default swaps throughout the
credit crisis. A plot of the CDS spread time series covering the
financial crisis of 2008. The data ranges from January 2002 to December
2011. We can observe three market phases. Most CDS spreads peak
around March 2009. The CDS prices are quoted in basis points (bp). The
purpose of this plot is to highlight the market regimes, rather than the
individual CDS spread evolution. Accordingly, the CDS spreads of all the
financial entities are plotted here.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061815.g001
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nodes (see Materials and Methods). Symmetrically, we also
introduce the vulnerability centrality of a node i, denoted as bi, see
Eqn. 2. This measure captures, instead, the idea that a node is
more heavily vulnerable if it has strong dependencies from many
nodes which are in turn heavily vulnerable. In both cases, the
values are normalised between 0 and 1. In analogy to the random
walker for PageRank [18], both measures hold a physical
interpretation in terms of expected numbers of e-drawup’s. The
first is proportional to the expected number of e-drawup’s that
occur in the network, conditional to a first e-drawup at node i. The
second is proportional to the expected number of e-drawup’s that
occur in i, conditional to a first e-drawup occurring at all the other
nodes.
Figure 3 is a scatter plot of first-order impact centrality and first-
order vulnerability centrality of each firm, i.e. taking into account
only the immediate neighbours of each node (see Materials and
Methods). Values of both centrality measures are not normalized
here in order to compare them across different periods. The size of
the circles reflects the average debt level of each firm. As we can
see, some firms in period 1, eg. BOFA, exhibited a systemic impact
of approximately 30. This can be interpreted as: an e-drawup in
the CDS time series of a firm affects the CDS time series of an
expected number of 30 other market participants. In particular,
there is a group of institutions with similar values of both impact
and vulnerability between 20 and 30, which moreover also have
the highest debt levels. This suggests that a perturbation in their
debt levels would spread across a very large subset of the network.
Since the size of the debt of such institutions is the largest, a small
percentage change in their debt would cause a large change in the
distress of the debt issued by others firms in the network. In period
2, both impact and vulnerability centrality tend to increase and
almost double for many of the larger financial institutions, but this
general increase is very heterogenous. In period 3, many firms
decrease their debt, their impact and their vulnerability except a
small group institutions for which impact remains high. Notice
that the size, impact, and vulnerability centralities are not linearly
correlated, e.g. UBS in period 3 exhibits high impact but low
vulnerability, while at the same time, it experiences a drop in its
total size.
Figure 2. The distribution of non-zero values of interdependence Wij across the three periods. (a) The counts in periods 2 and 3 are
higher than in period 1. In addition, during periods 2 and 3 the distributions of Wij have longer tails compared to period 1. (b) The distribution of
non-zero values of trend reinforcement Wii across the three periods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061815.g002
Figure 3. Scatter plot of impacting versus vulnerability
centrality. Each institution in the CDS market is represented by three
dots depending on the period (blue, green, red refers to period 1, 2, 3,
respectively). The size of each node is determined by the average debt
of a financial institution relative to the maximum average debt of a
financial institution in a given period. Note that in this picture we
present the non-normalised values of systemic impact and vulnerability,
this exercise enables the comparison of node’s centrality measures
across periods. It can be seen that, while in period 1 most institutions
are located between the two dotted lines, in period 2 and 3 many of
them move to the top and bottom region. This means that ratio
between the two centrality measures varies with the market phase. Few
institutions of interest are labelled. For example, Bank of America
(BOFA) remains in the same region across the three periods. With
reference to the subsequent bow-tie construction used in Figure 4: The
scatter plot is divided into 3 regions. Nodes in the region above the line
riw3=2 correspond to the IN. Nodes in the region 2=3vriv3=2
correspond to the SCC. Nodes in the region riv2=3 correspond to the
OUT.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061815.g003
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The period under observation although covering 10 years
represents a single observation of a crisis and cannot be used to
draw definitive conclusions on the emergence of crises in general.
However, recent works on systemic risk in financial networks have
shown that the number of links play an ambiguous role. Few links
are functional to diversify the individual risk. However, too many
links generate systemic risk if they co-exist with mechanisms that
either amplify the distress (such as in the case of contagion), or
simply increase the persistency of the distress in time (such as for
trend reinforcement) [16]. As we have seen, the CDS market
exhibits a core of more than 100 nodes, that is almost a fully
connected graph (i.e. with maximal degree) and where the weight
of the links represent in many cases strong interdependencies.
Moreover, the time series exhibit also a high level of trend
reinforcement. Thus, according to the theoretical results men-
tioned earlier, in such a situation, even small levels of amplification
can make the whole system very unstable. Notice that moving
from period 1 to period 2, the values of most CDS’s raised
dramatically, in many cases by one order of magnitude (see
Figure 1). This argument together with the finding described by
Figure 3 suggests as a possible intuitive narrative that the CDS
market was already potentially unstable in period 1, and that
period 2 represents an unraveling that sooner or later would have
happened anyway and that was mitigated by the intervention of
the lender of last resort.
Notice that it is generally thought that without the massive
intervention of the Federal Reserve (FED) through various emergency
programs that lasted from the fall of 2008 until the summer of
2009, [19] there would have been a melt-down of the whole
financial system. Indeed, previous findings based on different data
[6] estimate that in that period the default of a few institutions
would have triggered a systemic default.
Link Pruning and Bow-tie Extraction
While in- and out-degree remain very homogenous over time
and not very informative since the graph is very dense, the values
of both centrality measures are more broadly spread across the
range ½0,70 (see Figures S1, S2, S3 in File S1). If we focus on the
ratio between impacting and vulnerability centrality, ri~
bi
ci
, in the
scatter plot of Figure 3, it is possible to identify three regions
(above, between and below the dotted lines), corresponding to
three different roles of the nodes.
Nodes are located in the top region if they have a value riw3=2,
meaning that they impact the network 1.5 times more than they
are vulnerable to it. Symmetrically, nodes are in the bottom region
if riv2=3. Finally, nodes that appear in the middle region are
those that impact and are vulnerable to the network in a
comparable manner. According to this classification, while in
period 1 most institutions are located in the middle region, in
period 2 and 3 they progressively move to the top and the bottom
region. We observe that there are many nodes in the network that
not only have a high impacting centrality, but also a high
vulnerability centrality. From a systemic risk perspective it is
essential to study nodes that are prone to distress; however, from a
policymakers perspective it is also vital to monitor nodes that are
not only prone to distress, but that also have a high impacting
centrality as distress in such nodes could lead to a systemic
collapse.
The values of impact and vulnerability centralities spread out from
period 1 to period 2 and 3 (see Figures S1, S2, S3 in File S1). Thus,
in order to visually enhance the role of nodes that are mostly one
or the other we carry out the following link pruning procedure. In
each period, for nodes located in the top region, we remove all
their incoming links. Symmetrically, for those in the bottom
region, we remove all the outgoing links. Since the initial network
is strongly connected and dense, in this way, we obtain a bow-tie
structure (see Materials and Methods). The position of a node in
the bow-tie is related to its systemic importance. Indeed, the IN,
SCC and OUT component of the bow-tie correspond to the top,
middle and bottom regions of Figure 3, respectively (e.g. the nodes
in the IN are those that impact the network more than they are
vulnerable). Note that the bow-tie structure is constructed based on
the choice of impacting-vulnerability centrality, i.e. nodes with
riw3=2 are in the IN, nodes with 2=3vriv3=2 are in the SCC,
and nodes with riw2=3 are in the OUT. In fact, for any dw0,
where d[(0,1). The lines 1{d and 1zd would separate the nodes
into three regions. Thus, the choice of d is based on the level of
impacting-vulnerability centrality that is of interest. As an exercise
to verify the effect of d on emergence of a bow-tie structure in our
network, we perform as robustness analysis on d (see Figures S5,
S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11 in File S1) for more visualisations. Notice
that if a network is a directed SCC, and one truncates all incoming
links of nodes with riv1{d, and all outgoing links for nodes with
riw1zd. Then, it is not always the case that the filtered network
has a non-trivial SCC (see Figure S4 in File S1).
We then introduce a novel method for the visualisation of the
bow-tie (Figure 4). This enables the representation, at the same
time, of a network structure, the position of the nodes in the
various component of the bow-tie, as well as their level of
impacting centrality (see Table S2 in File S1). In Figure 4, the
circle represents the SCC, the top (bottom) section correspond to
the IN (OUT). E.g. within the SCC, more central nodes are
located towards the centre of the circle. The colour code and the
size of the dots also reflect their centrality, such that the red and
large dots are the most central (see caption of Figure 4). This
visualisation allows to track how individual institutions become
more or less central, or if they changed role across periods (see File
S1). In period 1, most of the nodes of the bow-tie are in the SCC
(85), with 4 and 6 in the IN and OUT respectively. Moreover,
most nodes in the centre of the SCC are banks and investment
banks, while insurance and real estate companies tend to be in the
periphery of the SCC (see File S1), This implies that in the normal
phase most of the nodes impact the network, and are vulnerable to
the network in a comparable manner. In period 2, the bow-tie
grows overall, but the SCC (97 nodes) grows proportionally less
than IN (19 nodes) and OUT (22 nodes). Of the 81 nodes that
were disconnected in period 1, twenty seven migrated to the SCC
(Figure 4). In period 3, the size of the bow-tie remains unchanged,
but the SCC shrinks by about a 50% (from 97 to 47 nodes), as a
result of a migration to the IN (37 nodes) and mostly to the OUT
(53 nodes) (see Table S1 in File S1). In particular, the nodes with
high impacting centrality are now all located in the IN and not,
anymore, in the SCC.
One should not forget that the original network is a strongly
connected graph and the bow-tie is obtained with a filtering.
Therefore, it is not the case that the nodes in the IN are not
connected among each other. This means that in case a few nodes
would have defaulted, the others would still have been heavily
affected. However, the observed migration of nodes implies that,
compared to the normal period, there has been an increasing
polarisation between nodes (IN) that predominantly impact the
network, and nodes (OUT) that predominantly are vulnerable to
the network.
The above analysis of impacting and vulnerability centralities,
and the bow-tie extraction allows us to move from an initial
picture in which all nodes seemed to be equally important from the
point of view of systemic risk, to a much more refined picture. In
CDS Networks: Too Interconnected to Be Stable?
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terms of systemic impact, we can now focus on a small subset of
the nodes, viz. nodes that have a high impacting centrality and are
located in the centre of the SCC, or in the top part of the IN. This
finding is corroborated by anecdotal evidence [20] about the role
of important actors of the credit crisis of 2008 (see File S1).
Conversely, the impacting centrality allows also to identify nodes
that suffer the most from an impact originating from the others.
Remarkably, there is no evidence of one or two nodes dominating
the others in terms of systemic importance. In contrast, we see that
in each period a set of about top 19 nodes have similar values of
centrality.
Materials and Methods
Data
Credit Default Swaps (CDS’s) are financial derivatives instruments
in which the seller provides the buyer protection against a credit
event of a reference entity (see File S1). Our aim is to analyse the
time series data of CDS prices, or spreads, of top US and
European financial institutions in the last years. The data,
acquired via a subscription to Bloomberg, consists of CDS spreads
of single name entities denominated in US dollars and in the Euro,
encompassing a total of 176 top firms in the financial sector, in the
period from 2nd January 2002 until 1st December 2011. As shown
in Figure 1, the time series display three distinct phases.
Accordingly, we divide the data into three parts: (1) January
2002–May 2006 (representative of a normal phase); (2) May 2006–
March 2009 (volatile with an upwards trend); (3) March 2009–
December 2011 (volatile with a downwards trend market
scenario). The motivation to do a period-wise analysis is to extract
the network structure before, during and after the crisis of 2008.
This data window covers a 2560 weekdays. e-drawups. For each
institution’s time series we detect what we call e-drawup’s. An e-
drawup is an extension of the notion of an e-drawdown [21]. It
refers to a persistent upward movement in a time series until a
peak has been reached, after which the time series declines (or, has
a ‘‘correction’’) by more than an amplitude e (see Figure 5a). Since
the CDS spread represents the cost of insurance, an e-drawup
signifies an increase in the default probability of that institution, as
perceived by the market.
We compute the e-drawup’s in each of the time series using the
following algorithm, which we describe using the example
illustrated in Figure 5a. Suppose, we start our analysis of an e-
drawup from the first green point from the left in Figure 5a. The
step are as follows: (1) We compute the local variation in the time
series for the last ten days, call it e. (2) compute local extrema. (3)
Figure 4. The network of the CDS reference entities from period 2. Each of the nodes represents a financial institution. Outgoing links from
nodes that are in the top, or the IN of the bow-tie structure represent the estimated potential impact of a financial institution to its neighbours (see
Materials and Methods). The nodes in the SCC are placed within a circle of radius one and centred at the origin. The distance of each node from the
centre is 1{Impacting centrality. The angle increases linearly from 0 to 2p. Thus, the closer a node is to the centre the higher is vulnerability-
impacting centrality. Similarly, nodes in the OUT and IN are placed between angles p=2- 5p=8 and 3p=2 - 13p=8 respectively. In addition, nodes in the
OUT and IN are placed with an offset of 1.1 from the origin. With the bow-tie representation we are able to visually compare the centrality of a node i
with node j. Also, with this visualisation we are able to extract a network of nodes that mostly impact the others, nodes that impact just as much as
they get vulnerable, and nodes that are only vulnerable to the other nodes in the network. The size and the colour of the node reflects vulnerability-
impacting centrality of a node (nodes with larger vulnerability-impacting centrality are in red). The colour assigned to links is based on where the
links point to in the network. Links originating from IN to the SCC are in bright blue. Links originating in the SCC to nodes in the SCC are in green.
Links that are originating in the SCC to the OUT are dull blue grey colour.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061815.g004
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Goto first local minima, call it e-drawupcandidate (on day three,
Figure 5a). (4) Iterate to the set of local maxima and minima
(occurring on days 5 and 6 respectively, see Figure 5a). Compute
the difference between the maxima and the minima, call it correction
amplitude (correction amplitude refers to the decline in price followed
after an increase in price). (5) Update e by computing the local
variation of the last ten days. (6) If correction amplitude§ e. Then, we
record the e-drawup on the day it occurs (day 7 in Figure 5a). And,
we update e-drawupcandidate. Otherwise, we iterate to the next
minima and goto the succeeding maxima and repeat steps above.
The choice of using 10 days to compute local variations was the
result of following preliminary analysis. We have computed
drawups for 50 time series using various numbers of days ranging
from 1 until 102. At one extreme we take all the local maxima in
the time series as drawups, which is not desirable (see Figure 5b).
At the other extreme the algorithm ignores too many drawups. e-
drawups in general can be validated by eye only and thus we could
not run an optimisation function that would maximise the number
of ‘‘true’’ drawups, as a function of the number of days chosen to
compute local variations. After a thorough visual inspection of 50
time series at various scales, we picked 10 days as the best choice of
the time window. Note that on weekends and holidays, the last
traded price is carried forward; however, we have verified that this
does not affect the e - drawup algorithm.
With the above procedure, we are able to detect the e-drawup’s
in the the time series data. Once we have detected the e-drawup’s
in i{th time series, we construct the vector vi for node i, whose
length is the same as the length of the time series, T . Also, vi(t)~1
if there was a drawup on day t in node i, and zero otherwise.
Co-movements. When market participants buy and sell
insurance on each other, their financial performances can become
interdependent (see File S1). Therefore, we are interested in
detecting joint upward movements in pairs of time series. In order
to detect co-movements we implement the following algorithm
(notice, that the resulting matrices of co-movements Ptij are square
but not symmetric):
(1) Select a given node i. (2) Loop from day t~1 till t~T and
compare each vi(t) with all vj(tzt) where j[f1,:::,Ng and
t[f0,1,2,3g. (3) If vi(t)~1 and vj(tzt)~1, then
countt~counttz1. (4) Update a matrix of counts of joint
drawup’s, i.e. Ptij~
countt
T
. (5) Repeat the steps (1)–(4) for all
node i.
Correction for Randomness and Finite Size: Statistical
Significance. In order to account for the co-movements that
could arise by chance, for each pair (i,j) we subtract the expected
number of co-movements in the case of independent events and
we obtain W tij~P
t
ij{P
t
i P
t
j . In order to correct for finite size
effects, we carry out a permutation test. For each pair (i,j) we
generate 100 permutations of the respective time series of e-
drawups. We compute the corresponding 100 values of W t,controlij
and the value ~Wij
t,control
that corresponds to a 95% confidence
level. This means that if the empirical value W tij exceeds
~Wij
t,control
, it has less than 5% chance to come from the same
distribution. Accordingly, we keep the empirical value of W tij only
if it passes this test and otherwise we set it to 0. In the following,
when we say that only statistically significant links are retained, we
refer to the above filtering procedure.
Interpreting the Conditional Probability Matrix W. We
now average across values of t the filtered matrices, i.e.
Wij~
1
4
Xt~3
t~0
W tij . Notice that the quantity represented by Wij
is not a measure of causality. However, under the assumption that
the observed joint e-drawup frequencies are an approximation of
probabilities, each entry Wij of the matrix W has a precise
meaning: It is an estimate of the probability of an e-drawup in the
time series of j at a given day, conditional to an e-drawup in time
series of node i in the preceding 3 days and in the same day,
averaged over the days of the time delay.
Impacting and Vulnerability Centrality. In line with the
notion of feedback centrality (e.g., PageRank [18], see File S1), we
introduce the Impacting Centrality ci,
Figure 5. Illustration of the e-drawup methodology. (a) The * represents local extrema that were not detected as drawups. The red-dots
represent local maxima that were picked up as candidates for a e-drawup. The green-dots represent the local minima that were picked up for a e-
drawup. Compare the difference between the maxima and minima on days 5 and 6 respectively with e. Since, e greater than the difference, we iterate
to the next set of local maxima and minima on days 7 and 8, keeping day 3 as the day from when we count a e-drawup (b) The plot highlights the e-
drawup methodology applied to the time series of American International Group (AIG) and Merrill Lynch (MER).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061815.g005
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ci~
X
j
~Wijc
(0)
j zb
X
j
~Wijcj ð1Þ
and the Vulnerability Centrality bi,
bi~
X
j
~W
0
ijb
(0)
j zb
X
j
~W
0
ijbj ð2Þ
In the definition above: c
(0)
j and b
(0)
j are the intrinsic centrality,
which for the sake of simplicity are set to 1; the matrices are
normalized so to be row-stochastic, ~Wij~Wij=
P
l Wlj ,
~W
0
ij~W
0
iyj=
P
l W
0
lj , with W
0
denoting the transpose of W ; the
parameter b is a dampening factor which we set to 0:85 in line
with the PageRank [18] heuristic [18]. Eqn. 1 and 2 can be
analytically solved to yield the solution, c~( { ~W0){1 ~W0v and
b~( { ~W){1 ~Wb. We can interpret the Impacting Centrality ci as
the extent to which a firm i impacts the network via direct
connections and, recursively, via indirect connections. Analogous-
ly, we can interpret the Vulnerability Centrality bi as the extent to
which a firm i gets impacted by the network via direct connections
and, recursively, via indirect connections.
In terms of physical analogy, in the case of PageRank [18], it is
known that the score of a node is proportional to the expected
number of visits of a random walker that is let free to navigate in
the network hopping randomly from a node to the successor
nodes. Notice that because of possible cycles in the network a
walker can visit a node many times and thus the expected number
of visits by random walkers can in general exceed the number of
walkers. We can map the visit of the random walker into the
occurrence of an e-drawup. The Impacting Centrality of a node i
is then proportional to the expected number of e-drawup’s
occurring across all nodes in the network, conditional to an initial
e-drawup at node i. Conversely, the Vulnerability Centrality of a
node i is proportional to the expected number of e-drawup’s
occurring at node i, conditional to an initial e-drawup at some
node j=i in the network.
Bow-tie structure. A bow-tie network is a directed network
consisting of four main parts, as follows. The Strongly Connected
Component (SCC): set of nodes such that each can reach any other
via a directed path; OUT: set of all nodes that can be reached,
directly or indirectly, from the SCC; IN: the set of all nodes that
reach the SCC directly or indirectly. The fourth and last component
of the bow-tie structure, Tubes and Tendrils (TT) represent the set
of all nodes that are not a part of the SCC; however, a node in the
TT can either be reached from the IN and/or OUT.
Link Pruning and Bow-tie Extraction. If a network is dense
and strongly connected it is difficult to understand who impacts
whom. We then proceed to the following link pruning. We compute
the ratio between the Impacting and the Vulnerability Centrality,
ri~
bi
ci
, see Eqn. 1 & 2. If riw3=2 then we remove all the incoming
links of the node i. This means that all nodes that exhibit riw3=2
will only have outgoing links after the pruning. Similarly, nodes that
exhibit riv2=3 get all their outgoing links removed. The remaining
nodes, i.e. such that 2=3vriv3=2 retain both the incoming and
outgoing links. With few exceptions, this link pruning procedure
extracts out of a dense strongly connected network a subnetwork
with a bow-tie structure. This is useful to highlight the role of a node.
Those nodes mainly impacting the others end up in the IN
component, after the pruning. Those nodes mainly vulnerable to
the others end up in the OUT. Those nodes being equivalently
impacting and vulnerable end up in the SCC.
Conclusion
We have analysed the e-drawup’s in the CDS’s time series for the
top US and EU institutions throughout the last 10 years. By
measuring the frequency of joint drawup’s in pairs of CDS time
series we have estimated the level of interdependence and trend
reinforcement in the market. According to previous theoretical
works on financial networks, the interplay of these two mechanisms
is deeply linked to the emergence of systemic risk. We have found
statistically significant levels of both interdependence and trend
reinforcement. Moreover, we see an increase of both in acute phases
of the crisis. The result suggests that high interdependence and
trend reinforcement together with high level of individual riskiness
are possible indicator of the level of systemic risk. Indeed, when
CDS spreads were at their peak in 2008, implying high risk of
individual default, movements in the spread of a few institutions
were very likely to be followed by movements in another and also in
the same institutions. This means distress in a few key players would
have likely propagated to many other players in the market.
Furthermore, we have carried out what to our knowledge is the
first study of the complex network of CDS interdependencies. In
order to investigate the systemic importance of individual nodes,
we have introduced two novel measures. The impacting centrality
captures, in a recursive way, how much a node impacts the
network. Symmetrically, the Vulnerability centrality captures how
much a node is vulnerable to the network. These two measures
enable the extraction of a bow-tie structure from the initial
network and to clarify the role of the nodes. In Basel III [22]
interconnectedness has been identified as one of the pillars to
identify Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI). The
interconnectedness of an institution can be assessed by its ability to
impact other institutions and its vulnerability to the others in the
financial network. We show that in the CDS markets size, impact,
and vulnerability are not trivially correlated, at least not in the
volatile phase of the market, i.e. period 2. In the initial phase the
system is homogeneous with similar impact and vulnerability
centralities across players, while in the following periods there is an
increase in both impact and vulnerability centralities, but they do
increase in a heterogenous manner.
The specific findings of this analysis are relevant to the broad
audience interested in the issue of systemic risk and systemically
important financial institutions, including policy makers. More-
over, our approach is very general and applies to any set of time
series associated to units that operate in interaction. In particular,
it is of interest for those cases where the direct interaction between
units is not observable and the dependence has to be inferred from
the dynamics. In this respect, our paper contributes to a stream of
work on the observability and the reconstruction of complex
networks [23] .
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